No. 2 = THE LIVED BODY , is it so?

>>109
Contrary to what you said. But if we're going to talk about the body, I currently don't think No.1 is directly related to the body, but rather to the conscious rational life, and perhaps to humanity as a collective, as a whole. Maybe No.1 is like the Apollo.
In the most superficial way, No. 2 has to do with the spiritual or psychic life, as opposed to No. 1. More accurate:
>The play and counterplay between personalities No. 1 and No. 2, which has run through my whole life, has nothing to do with a “split” or dissociation in the ordinary medical sense. On the contrary, it is played out in every individual. In my life No. 2 has been of prime importance, and I have always tried to make room for anything that wanted to come to me from within. He is a typical figure, but he is perceived only by the very few. Most people’s conscious understanding is not suffciient to realize that he is also what they are.
>Although at that time I doubtless saw no difference as yet between personalities No. 1 and No. 2, and still claimed the world of No. 2 as my own personal world, there was always, deep in the background, the feeling that something other than myself was involved. It was as though a breath of the great world of stars and endless space had touched me, or as if a spirit had invisibly entered the room—the spirit of one who had long been dead and yet was perpetually present in timelessness until far into the future. Denouements of this sort were wreathed with the halo of a numen.
The No.2 for Jung was something like Zarathustra or Faust, which in my understanding is something that poets would like to go and dedicate themselves to. Jung chose No.1 in the same way that Goethe made his Wilhelm Meister ultimately choosing the tower society. Jung was in agreement with Goethe in that they both choose No.1. Simply put, it actually leads them to know what that No.2 is (It's no doubt that Jung or Goethe both have had plenty of experience with the No.2. If you look up in this book, you'll find that Jung's childhood life was full of No. 2 manifestations, mainly through his dreams or some kind of theophany, or through his unconscious rituals), to be a kind of ethicist in the sense of Kierkegaard's dichotomy between the esthetic and the ethical, "immediacy and reflection". I think that for Jung, Nietzsche was the kind of person who went too far into No.2.
Jung's statement here that he identifies more with No. 1 is definitely not the same as his abandonment of No. 2. His whole life's work was based on his experience of No. 2, and he was as complex and sophisticated as Goethe, which, perhaps, in a sense, makes him thought that he was actually nobler than the poets or Nietzsche.

Thanks for your reply! No.1 does seem to be related to rationality, eidos or some enlightenment stuff, while No.2 gives me a gnostical feeling. Is this understanding close to what you said "poets would like to go and dedicate themselves to"?
The idea that No.2 equals body came to me from my recent reading of Merleau-Ponty. In my understanding, the phenomenal body he mentioned is the original body that is prior to all dualistic distinctions, a hidden mystery, and I believe that all experiences come from it. So I think that No.1 = rational reflection, No.2 = the original body, and Jung seems to be saying that No.2 can't be grasped theoretically.

>>110
Exactly. The two are much more firmly grounded and thus more complete while the poets etc. are far too partial. I'll say that Goethe and Jung ventured towards the Naive, in the naive-sentimental dichotomy, which is in essence aristocratic, while Nietzsche et al. while longing to be aristocratic were essentially stuck in the metaphorical "bourgeoisie" and the "commoner", even though not crudely but in its manifestation as romanticism.
Maybe incidentally Goethe and Jung are remarkable in that their mannerism are also pretty refined and they enjoyed a rather leisurely life, in contrast to those "mad" poets. In Thomas Mann's Goethe und Tolstoi there's a good essay that illustrates how Goethe is in no way a typical figure that people associate with the poets.
No.2 is the personality that is more primordial and more in contact with the collective unconscious and No.1 is the social mask, the persona, that the manifest social world constructs.

>>112
It can be said like that since Jung also held later in his life that one partial way of viewing the collective unconscious is that it is something somatic.
But Jung has a rather Schellingian (while unacknowledged) view regarding the cosmos, so it can hardly be said that without Nous there should be a somatic element that serves as a substrate over which Nous arises. The No.2 is in contact with the collective unconscious, and the collective unconscious can be literally everything if you hold a rather Kantian view of the world like Jung; the collective unconscious is the "entity" from which everything, including creative energy, and maybe destructive energy, flows.
No.2 is that which is in contact with the substratum. No.1 can be said to be that which arises from rational reflection, if the very society that determines the form of No.1 is a rational construct.

>>111
Btw. Let me give a try to directly attach the pdf. (I have a lot of processed pdfs and haven't bulk-uploaded them to libgen. Putting them in chan is probably better.)

>>115
I gave it a split for I use mainly an e-ink reader to read texts, and unsplit files are really a pain to read on that thing.
I'm well aware of the fact that sioyek lacks a 2-column view feature so the unsplit one may come way more handy but this should really be regarded as a deficiency of the software.
https://dufs.itinerariummentis.org/book/Friedrich%20Wilhelm%20Joseph%20Schelling/F.%20W.%20J.%20Schelling%20-%20The%20Ages%20of%20the%20World.pdf

nice and complicated for me, and, "the naive-sentimental dichotomy", this statement is interesting, where does it come from?

>>117
I'm mainly referring to Schiller's On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, but it is quite a universal one,
- W. P. Ker's Epic and Romance is also modeled on it, where Epic = Naive, Romance = Sentimental.
- Worringer's Abstraction and Empathy and Form in Gothic, roughly, Empathy = Naive, Abstraction in its gothic form = Sentimental.
In general what is classical, Latin, "rational" (Italian/French, or rather, Roman) is naive, and what is romantic, German, is sentimental.

>>118
I think it might even be possible to simply say that Apollonian = Naive and Dionysian = Sentimental though it is quite a stretch.

>>113
I was largely reading Schelling and Jung at the same time, and the transmission between them e.g. Schelling's A, A^2, A^3 and that similiar thing for Jung, may be obvious.
unconscious -> conscious+(unconscious "I" as an object) -> individual.
>Philosophy is, as such, nothing but an anamnests, a remembrance for the I of what it has done and suffered in its general (its pre-individual) being (Seyn)

>naive-sentimental
Sometimes it makes me wonder how Hardenburg and Hoederlin fit that Schiller's naive-sentimental mold. Hardenburg was close to the naive, and Hoederlin was close to sentimental but he was not lacking any Apollo element, he was clearly more ancient. Kierkegaard or Nietzsche were even more like the typical avant-garde mad poets than the two poets. And as for Goethe, his poetry was at some point greatly inspired by Schelling's natural philosophy, so he wouldn't have written typical poetry. But, really, I can't surely classify a poet based on Schiller's dichotomy. But if comes a Trakl, the answer is pretty self-explanatory.
I don't really know much about Schiller, but on early days Schiller treated very well to Hoederlin, perhaps for the reason that he thought Hoederlin as a sucessful sentimental poet. And in his later years Schiller suddenly turned away from Hoederlin, confusing. But Goethe's considerable disdain for Hoederlin made perfect sense.
There're several passages in Lessing's Laocoon depiciting the contrast between the state of engaging war and the treatment of the dead between the Greeks and the Trojans, and it pretty much says the same thing.

>>120
Not really the same thing, but it's almost close to that.

>We finer Europeans of a wiser posterity have, I know, more control over our lips and eyes. Courtesy and decency forbid cries and tears. We have exchanged the active bravery of the first rude ages for a passive courage. Yet even our ancestors were greater in the latter than the former. But our ancestors were barbarians. To stifle all signs of pain, to meet the stroke of death with unaverted eye, to die laughing under the adder’s sting, to weep neither over our own sins nor at the loss of the dearest of friends, are traits of the old northern heroism. The law given by Palnatoko to the Jomsburghers was to fear nothing, nor even to name the word fear.
>Not so the Greek. He felt and feared. He expressed his pain and his grief. He was ashamed of no human weakness, yet allowed none to hold him back from the pursuit of honor or the performance of a duty. Principle wrought in him what savageness and hardness developed in the barbarian. Greek heroism was like the spark hidden in the pebble, which sleeps till roused by some outward force, and takes from the stone neither clearness nor coldness. The heroism of the barbarian was a bright, devouring flame, ever raging, and blackening, if not consuming, every other good quality.
>When Homer makes the Trojans advance to battle with wild cries, while the Greeks march in resolute silence, the commentators very justly observe that the poet means by this distinction to characterize the one as an army of barbarians, the other of civilized men. I am surprised they have not perceived a similar characteristic difference in another passage.
>The opposing armies have agreed upon an armistice, and are occupied, not without hot tears on both sides (δάκρυα θερμὰ χέοντες), with the burning of their dead. But Priam forbids his Trojans to weep (οὐδ’ εἴα κλαίειν Πρίαμος μέγας), “and for this reason,” says Madame Dacier; “he feared they might become too tender-hearted, and return with less spirit to the morrow’s fight.” Good; but I would ask why Priam alone should apprehend this. Why 6does not Agamemnon issue the same command to his Greeks? The poet has a deeper meaning. He would show us that only the civilized Greek can weep and yet be brave, while the uncivilized Trojan, to be brave, must stifle all humanity. I am in no wise ashamed to weep (Νεμεσσῶμαί γε μὲν οὐδὲν κλαίειν), he elsewhere makes the prudent son of wise Nestor say.
>https://www.gutenberg.org/files/73078/73078-h/73078-h.htm

>>120
>Schelling and Jung
S. J. McGrath's The Dark Ground of Spirit makes a good study of that. Jung's Schellingianism is just obvious to the fault.

>Hoederlin and Novalis
Hoederlin is enormously sentimental. Novalis is a blend, his poetry is quite sentimental (especially his prose poems), but his works and philosophical speculations are naive. Goethe is the typical naive poet. Schelling is naive.
When you sense scents of Kantianism, it is almost deemed to be sentimental. After all what is the model of sentimental poetry is just German pietism, or even better, Luthereanism, without the Rhenish mysticism and Boehmian "alchemy" stuff.
But I think after German idealism Schiller's classification really doesn't works that well. I'm merely pointing to a tendency.

>>120
In Mozart's compositions, the "heavy" of this naivety or its meaning is at its peak.
A similar one can be found here: https://blog.henle.de/en/2024/04/08/on-mozarts-second-naivete-alfred-einstein/

>>121
Lessing is a forerunner so no surprise. It's a kind of universal classification that time and again appears in aesthetics, then in psychoanalysis. It's been years since I've read aesthetics but I think he's battling Winckelmann who is the representative of classicism.
The general tendency is, viewed post factum, expressionism vs "imitation of nature" (while this "nature" is in hindsight only seen as natural and idealistic - pertaining to the ideal societal order - by the high mimetic society)

"Naive" is really roughly "high mimetic" (the term invented by Northrop Frye) when the milieu is 17-18th century. But if the milieu is the middle ages, or ancient Greece, or ancient Rome, then the character changes.

>>116
Thank you! I'll add a TOC to this then. Sioyek is really unstable, and recently it's cpu usage become wild. But actually they have a toggle_two_page_mode now on dev branch (conflicting with presentation mode though).
The reason I'm not very comfy with Zathura is their selection-clipboard is really hard to use. any ideas on tinkering this?

>>125
>selection-clipboard
Maybe just try it again? There was an update recently that changed the behavior.

>>116
>>125
Splited pdf with TOC.

stunning thoughts, allow me to make no more replies, maybe several years later I will be back and be able to continue this topic…

LMAO.